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LAWYER DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
CLIENTS: OUTRIGHT REJECTION-NO;
LIMITATIONS ON ISSUES AND
ARGUMENTS-YES
SAMUEL STONEFIELD*

I.

A.

INTRODUCTION: THE QUESTION AND A PROPOSED ANSWER

The Question

In a society that prohibits most public discrimination, l should a
lawyer be able to discriminate in the selection or treatment of a
client or prospective client?2 To be more specific, should the con
duct of the following six attorneys who specialize in family law and
discriminate in the selection or treatment of clients be lawful or
unlawful?
• Lawyer 1 is a white male lawyer who refuses to represent Afri
can-Americans in his family law practice because he strongly
dislikes them and does not want to associate with any African
Americans. He states that his "strong personal feelings" would

* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. A.B.,1967,
Dartmouth College; J.D., 1971, Harvard University; Commissioner, Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination, 1977-1981. I would like to thank and to commend
my colleagues and our law review for their commitment to producing this symposium
and the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination for continuing to fight the
good fight.
1. I use the adjective "public" with discrimination to refer to acts of discrimina
tion both by public entities and by private entities (employers, landlords, banks, doc
tors, accountants and lawyers) acting in the "public sphere." See generally MICHAEL
WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983).
Our legal and social culture generally recognizes a sphere of private autonomy and
permits discrimination within that private sphere, such as in the choice of one's friends.
While the line between the public and private spheres is socially constructed, contingent
and not always clear, the conduct of lawyers in the practice of law is unquestionably in
the public sphere.
2. The term "discriminate" in this article means "to treat differently" because of
race, sex, national origin, religion, disability, sexual preference and any other character
istics deemed unlawful by the state's civil rights laws. I am referring only to the dispa
rate treatment theory of discrimination, "the most easily understood type of
discrinlination." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335
n.15 (1977).
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compromise his ability to provide zealous representation of a
black client;3
• Lawyer 2 is a white male lawyer who similarly dislikes African
Americans and refuses them as clients. However, his discrimi
nation is covert, not overt; he always gives a plausible, albeit
pretextual, reason for his denial (too busy to accept a new case
right now; might have a conflict; etc.);
• Lawyer 3 is a female attorney with what she calls a feminist
family law practice. While most of her clients are women, she
also represents men. However, in an initial interview prior to
forming a client relationship, she tells any male prospective cli
ent that, with respect to certain issues and arguments involving
financial obligations, she may treat him differently than she
would a female client, because of her interpretation of the law,
in the following manner.
A recurrent issue in family law practice is the determination of
the payments to be made by the wage-earner spouse to the
homemaker spouse, as a form of deferred compensation for
unpaid domestic labor, chiIdrearing and diverse other services
provided to support the wage-earner and his or her career.4
Most of the time, the wage-earner spouse is a man and the
homemakerspouse is a woman, and most of the time Lawyer 3
represents the female homemaker. Sometimes, however, the
roles are reversed and the homemaker is a male. In Lawyer 3's
opinion, while a male and female homemaker may often be
alike in certain respects,5 social and economic forces also make
3. For a similar hypothetical, see Robert T. Begg, Revoking the Lawyers License
to Discriminate in New York: The Demise of a Traditional Professional Prerogative, 7
GEO. J. LEGAL ETI-liCS 275, 276 (1993), and Brenda Jones Quick, Ethical Rules Prohib
iting Discrimination by Lawyers: The Legal Profession'S Response to Discrimination on
the Rise, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'y 5, 11 (1993). I strongly recommend
Professor Begg's article as a thorough and scholarly introduction to the many issues
raised by lawyer discrimination.
4. The divorce of business executive Gary Wendt and homemaker Lorna Wendt
provides a recent high-profile example of this type of dispute. The case went to trial
when Ms. Wendt rejected her husband's $8 million pre-trial offer of settlement. In a
preliminary decision on December 3, 1997, the trial judge awarded Ms. Wendt an esti
mated $20 million. See Betsy Morris, It's Her Job Too: Lorna Wendt's $20 Million Di
vorce Case Is the Shot Heard 'Round the Water Cooler, FORTUNE, Feb. 2, 1998, at 64.
For a good discussion of this issue, see Margaret F. Brinig, Property Distribution Phys
ics: The Talisman of Time and Middle Class Law, 31 FAM. L.Q. 93 (1997).
5. The actual allocation of domestic work and responsibilities between the wage
earner and the homemaker will be specific to each marriage. Lawyer 3 does not assume
that a male homemaker will have occupied the same domestic role and performed the
same work as a female homemaker. She believes in the accuracy of studies reporting
that, in households where both spouses are full-time wage-earners (and thus are "simi
larly situated" in this formal sense), the female spouse still does most of the domestic
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them unlike in other ways. Factors as diverse as the sex role
development in childrearing, allocation of roles and tasks in
the family, opportunities and expectations in schools, and dis
crimination and opportunities in the workplace have made the
world different for men and women. Lawyer 3 believes that it
is essential that courts recognize these differences and grant
female homemakers a "plus factor" not available to male
homemakers. Lawyer 3 will not make a "plus factor" argu
ment on behalf of men and will not oppose it if made on behalf
of a woman (although she may contest its implications in the
context of a specific case). Thus, if a househusband such as
Mr. Stropnicky comes to her, Lawyer 3 tells him that the argu
ments that she will make for him as a male homemaker may be
similar in some respects to, but also different in some respects
from, the arguments that she would for a female homemaker.6
She thus offers Mr. Stropnicky what she calls "conditional rep
resentation," an offer to represent him conditional upon his
understanding and acceptance of the particular terms of repre
sentation. If the male prospective client agrees to representa
tion on this basis (and affirms that agreement in writing),
Lawyer 3 will represent him.
• Lawyer 4 is a white male lawyer who is willing to represent,
and has represented, both white and Mrican-American clients
in most family law transactions but not in the context of the
drafting, review or litigation of a prenuptial agreement for a
person of one race marrying a person of another race. While
he will draft and review (and defend or enforce in court) a
prenuptial agreement for a black person marrying a black per
son or for a white person marrying a white person, he feels
strongly that inter-racial marriages are morally wrong and so
cially harmful and will not draft or review (or defend or en
force in court) a prenuptial agreement in these circumstances;
• Lawyer 5 is Judith Nathanson, the respondent in Stropnicky v.
work. See ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD & ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT:
WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989). Lawyer 3 interpolates
from these studies that a male homemaker is likely to do less domestic and childrearing
work than a female homemaker. Also, given the non-traditional nature of the male
homemaker role, Lawyer 3 also believes that, in general, male homemakers move back
and forth between homemaker and wage-earner roles more often than female home
makers do.
6. The lawyer also tells him that she will not assume that he, as a male home
maker, has occupied the same domestic role and performed the same work as has a
female homemaker in the "traditional" family. See supra note 5 and the accompanying
text. She will conduct a detailed intake interview to ascertain the facts in each particu
lar case.
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Nathanson. 7 Attorney Nathanson represents only women, and
not men, in her family law practice. s Her reasons for wanting
to represent women and not men involve a desire "to devote
her expertise to eliminating gender bias in the court system,"9
to specialize in "the issues that arise in representing wives in
divorce proceedings,"lO and "to feel a personal commitment to
her client's cause ... that in family law she has only exper
ienced ... in representing women."l1
• Lawyer 6 is a white male attorney who repres·ents only men in
family matters and has acquired particularized expertise in ad
vance planning to remove assets from the reach of possible di
vorce court decrees. He believes that limiting his practice to
men-and letting his clients and prospective clients know of
this limitation-is essential in creating and maintaining his cli
ents' confidence in him and his work, and that having their to
tal confidence is essential to his specialized asset-protection
counseling. Further, as a matter of personal and political con
viction, Lawyer 6 believes that those who work in the labor
and capital markets to create income and wealth should be en
titled to keep the fruits of their labor and that any problems
concerning the economic status of women after divorce should
be resolved either by prior contractual agreements of the par
ties, the individual efforts of the divorced female spouse or by
social relief programs funded by all taxpayers, and not by fam
ily court orders, which he views as forced contributions from
the former male spouse.

From a broad perspective, the decision to permit or prohibit
lawyer discrimination is. yet another example of interest balancing
in the regulatory context. In general, our society has strongly em
braced the antidiscrimination principle and its core idea that mak
ing decisions about other people on the basis of their race and sex is
presumptively wrong. 12 However, other goals, such as autonomy,
privacy or efficiency, sometimes trump the policy of nondiscrimina
7. 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39 (MCAD Feb. 25, 1997). This essay assumes
the reader's basic familiarity with this decision.
8. She represents both men and women "in other legal proceedings, not involving
controversies between men and women ...." Id. at 40.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. The extensive literature on the antidiscrinlination principle begins with the
seminal articles by Owen Fiss and Paul Brest. See Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975
Term~Foreword; In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1976); Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235
(1971).
.
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tion and then, through exemptions, exceptions and, affirmative de
fenses, statutes permit discrimination.1 3 A decision in the lawyer
context will balance the importance of prohibiting lawyer discrimi
nation against the importance of preserving the freedom to discrim
inate as an essential part of the practice of law. A decision-maker
that engages the issue will have to assess the practical and symbolic
consequences of the decision and then decide to permit, to prohibit
or to permit some and to prohibit other lawyer discrimination.
As a matter of both law and policy, the legal status of lawyer
discrimination is presently open for discussion as never before. The
longstanding traditional view permits all lawyer discrimination as a
necessary consequence of broad lawyer discretion to select or reject
clients.14 This view somehow survived the civil rights and regula
tory revolution of the 1960's and 1970's and has reigned largely un
challenged and virtually unnoticed. However, recent rules, and
rulings prohibiting lawyer discrimination-from sources as diverse
as state bar regulation, federal legislation, and a new application of
traditional state statutes-threaten the dominance of the traditional
view. The State of California, with more lawyers than any other
state in the nation,IS now prohibits lawyers from discriminating
against clients.1 6 The 1990 Am~ricans with Disability Act specifi
13. In recognition of the autonomy' interest of the small entity and the increased
enforcement costs of monitoring their conduct, statutes routinely exempt small employ
ers or landlords from coverage. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1994) (federal employ
ment discrimination laws applicable to employers with 15 or more employees only); 42
U.S.c. § 3603(c)(3) '(1994) (Federal Fair Housing Act applicable to owners of any
dwelling designed or intended for occupancy by five or more families). Religious em
ployers and Indian tribes are also exempt in certaIn instances. See 42 U.S.c.
§ 2000e(b). While there are no authoritative studies, given the large number of small
. employers and small hindlords, the exemptions permit discrimination in a considerable
proportion of the labor and housing markets.
14. See discussion Part III.A.2.
15. Barbara A. Curran & Clara N. Carson, The Lawyer Statistical Report: The
U.S. Legal Profession in the 199Os, 1994 AM. BAR. FOUND. 45. Based on a 1991 survey,
the authors reported 105,253 lawyers in California in 1991. See id. at 45.
16. See CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 2-400 (effective Mar. 1,
1994). The Rule prohibits unlawful discrimination in employment or in "accepting or
terminating any client," id. Rule 2-400(B)(I)-(2), and states that unlawful discrimina
tion "shall be determined by reference to applicable state. or federal statutes or deci
sions making unlawful discrimination in ... offering goods and services to the public,"
id. Rule 2-400(A)(3). An enforcement provision states that "[n]o disciplinary investiga
tion or proceeding may be initiated by the State Bar against a member under this rule
unless and until a tribunal of competent jurisdiction, other than a disciplinary tribunal,
shall have first adjudicated a complaint of alleged discrimination and found that unlaw
ful conduct occurred." Id. Rule 2-400(C). There are as of yet no decisions, rulings or
advisory opinions interpreting this Rule. Telephone interview with Lynn Cobb, Parale
gal, State Bar of California (Feb. 24, 1998).
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cally identifies the "office of ... [a] lawyer" as a place where disa
bility discrimination is prohibited,17 And the Stropnicky 18 decision
that led to this symposium ruled that a state public accommodation
law, enacted in 1865, prohibits all lawyer discrimination. 19 The is
sue is ready for reconsideration.
B.

A Proposed Answer: A Summary of the Argument

This essay offers an approach to lawyer discrimination that falls
between the total permission of the traditional view and the total
prohibition of the recent enactments and interpretations. Borrow
ing from the approach used in employment discrimination law, I
propose the prohibition of lawyer discrimination, subject to two
narrow affirmative defenses. The general prohibition represents so
ciety's strong opposition to discrimination and applies to lawyers
the same rule that currently applies to doctors, psychiatrists, ac
countants and virtually all other professions and occupations-the
rule of nondiscrimination. The two affirmative defenses recognize
that exceptional circumstances may justify otherwise-unlawful dis
crimination. One such defense, analogous to the BFOQ defense in
employment law,2° is based on professional standards and permits
In recent years, several jurisdictions have considered and enacted antidiscrimina
tion rules governing employment practices and the treatment of witnesses, court per
sonnel and attorneys. See Begg, supra note 3, at 303-18 (discussing proposed rules and
rules in Colorado, the District of Columbia, Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Washington). However, I have found no other juris
diction whose code of professional responsibility explicitly prohibits lawyer discrimina
tion against clients.
17. 42 U.S.c. § 12181(7)(F) (1994); see also James G. Frierson, Does Your Law
Office Meet the Requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 32 LAW OFF.
ECON. & MGMT. 397 (1991).
18. 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39 (MCAD Feb. 25, 1997).
19. Section 98 of Chapter 272 of the Massachusetts General Laws was enacted on
May 16, 1865, and amended on numerous occasions thereafter. Its text does not pro
vide any affirmative defenses, and the Single Commissioner's decision in Stropnicky did
not recognize any.
20. BFOQ is the acronym for "bona fide occupational qualification," a defense
recognized in Title VII, ADEA, and the ADA. Title VII reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this [title], (1) it shall not be an unlaw
ful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees ... on
the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where
religion, sex or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reason
ably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enter
prise ....
42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(e) (1994); see also 29 U.S.c. § 623(f)(1) (1994) (BFOQ also serves
as a defense in the ADEA when the use of age is "reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of the particular business"); 42 U.S.c. § 12113(a) (1994) (it may be a defense
to a charge of discrimination under the ADA that "an alleged application of qualifica
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discrimination if the attorney can prove that such discrimination is
necessary to the practice of law. The other affirmative defense per
mits discrimination if the lawyer proves that the prohibition violates
a constitutional right of either the lawyer or the client, such as the
right of free speech, the right of association or the right to avoid
being compelled to say what one does not want to say. Under my
proposal, a lawyer wishing to discriminate must present a written
request for the recognition of an affirmative defense, in advance of
any discrimination, to the state entity that regulates lawyers and
must obtain prior approval for any discrimination. 21
Section II sets forth my proposal and the reasons that support
it, and Sections III and IV interpret the proposal and apply it to the
conduct of the six attorneys in the introductory examples. In care
fully applying the antidiscrimination principle to the practice of law
and the interaction between lawyers and clients, these sections pro
duce an interesting finding: not all lawyer discrimination is alike.
As is common with employment, housing and other forms of dis
crimination, there are two distinct types of possible lawyer discrimi
nation: outright client rejection on the one hand, and limits in the
selection of particular issues and arguments, on the other. 22 The
discrimination of Lawyers 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 exemplifies outright client
rejection. The discrimination of Lawyer 3 represents the discrimi
natory limitation of issues and arguments. 23 Distinguishing be
tween these two types of lawyer discrimination is useful in thinking
about the discrimination that might be justified and the discrimina
tion that cannot.
tion standards ... that screen out ... or otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual
with a disability has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business
necessity").
The Supreme Court has narrowly construed the BFOQ exception, see Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977), to permit discrimination only in limited situations,
see International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187,201 (1991).
21. The requirement for a prior written ruling will encourage reflection and dis
cussion about the decision to discriminate, from which might come greater understand
ing of both the reasons for the prohibition and the reasons for the discrimination and,
over time, better mechanisms to accommodate the tensions between the prohibition
and the lawyer's practice. Written rulings will also provide guidance to other lawyers
and will develop both the boundaries between permissible and impermissible discrimi
nation and an understanding of the values that shape those boundaries.
22. These two types of discrimination are analogous to "failure to hire" and
"terms and conditions" discrimination in employment discrimination cases, 42 U.S.c.
§ 2000e, and "failure to rent" and "terms and conditions" discrimination in housing
discrimination cases, 42 U.S.c. § 3604(b) (1994).
23. It is classic disparate treatment because the lawyer treats a male client differ
ently than she would treat a female client.

110

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:103

As developed more fully in Section III, I conclude that none of
the many plausible conceptions of the practice of law, the lawyer's
role and the client's rights can justify discrimination in the outright
rejection of clients, and that prohibiting such discrimination does
not violate a lawyer's (or client's) constitutional rights. On the
other hand, I find that both affirmative defenses play an important
role in justifying the second type of discrimination in certain cases.
Both constitutional law and professional standards governing the
practice of law support a lawyer's qualified right not to make partic
ular arguments on behalf of a client of a particular race or sex that
he or she would make on behalf of a client of another race or sex.
In Section IV, I describe how these professional standards can jus
tify the actions of Lawyer 3 but not the conduct of the other five
lawyers. 24
I want to make two final introductory points before proceeding
with the substantive discussion. First, I want to acknowledge the
difficulty of the issues and my own uncertainty with my proposed
solution. The question of when, if ever, to permit lawyer discrimi
nation is difficult and surprisingly slippery. It involves basic and
deeply contested issues concerning the lawyer's role, the nature of
the practice of law and the' nature of a profession. It requires as
sessments of both lawyer-centered and client-centered views of
legal practice and the implications and limitations of those views. I
am far from certain that my proposals are correct as a matter of
either law or policy; I have changed my views more than once in the
preparation of this essay and will surely be forced to think hard
about changing them again. It will take time and experience to
build a shared vocabulary in this area and to develop some confi
dence in our individual and social jl!dgments. Given this difficulty
and uncertainty, we should favor approaches that foster dialogue
and discussion and that encourage us to understand better and to
accommodate inore effectively the tensions between the prohibition
against discrimination and evolving professional standards and con
stitutional rights.
24. I also explore how it may be possible to recast Judith Nathanson's claiin and·
view her as similar to LaWyer 3. While not how she presented herself or her claim and
thus not the basis on which the· Single Commissioner adjudicated the case, Lawyer 3's
claim seems to capture the core of Nathanson's concerns. In Section V, I suggest that
the Full Commission of the MCAD should incorporate my two proposed affirmative
defenses into the statute and then remand the case to the Single Commissioner to hold
further hearings and to determine whether Ms. Nathanson satisfied the requirements of
either or both of the affirmative defenses.
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Secondly, I want to explain the format used in the following
sections. The essay elaborates the approach summarized in this in
troduction by presenting a suggested legislative resolution and then
interpreting and applying that legislation. To assist in the explica
tion, I use the device of a hypotheticallegislature,zs one that heard
about the Stropnicky case, studied the issue of lawyer discrimina
tion and then enacted legislation prohibiting such discrimination,
subject to the two affirmative defenses. For me at least, the legisla
tive setting provides a policy-oriented perspective broader than the
one available when responding to issues raised by a particular case
or interpreting state or federal law or codes of professional respon
sibility. Further, locating the policy discussion and decision in a
legislature highlights several institutional features of lawyer dis
crimination that are easily overlooked: that the legal profession and
the judiciary are not the only sources of professional standards for
the profession;26 that a legislature may very well act to impose stan
dards if it determines that the legal profession's own standards are
distinctly out-of-touch with broad social norms; and that a legisla
ture will be skeptical of arguments based on what I will call "lawyer
exceptionalism," claims that the practice of law is so "special" that
the standards that apply to other occupations and professions
should not apply to lawyers.

25. This legislature is of course the creation of the author, a fifty-two year old
white male law professor who was, from 1977 to 1981, a Commissioner of the MCAD,
the agency whose Stropnicky decision inspired this symposium. I project onto this hy
pothetical legislature my views on how a conscientious legislature ought to approach
and to resolve these issues. I make no claim to descriptive accuracy; it is simply a heu
ristic device.
26. In this country, the judiciary is the primary regulator of lawyers, based both
on historical practice and the separation of powers grounds that the regulation of the
practice of law is part of the judicial function. This separation of powers perspective
supports what is known as the "negative inherent powers" doctrine, a radical form of
which holds that "any attempt by either the legislative or executive branch to entrench
on that exclusively judicial power is an unconstitutional usurpation." CHARLEs W.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 27 (1986). The doctrine is susceptible to serious
criticism and, even in jurisdictions that accept the doctrine, it is not absolute. See id. at
28-31. This essay assumes, without further discussion, that no state Supreme Court
would apply the doctrine to invalidate a state statute that prohibits lawyer discrimina
tion, especially not a statute that recognizes two affirmative defenses, one of which is
tied to professional standards as determined by the committee that regulates lawyers.
In any event, the legislative device in this essay is simply a method for presenting the
discussion. My underlying approach would work as well as an amendment to the Disci
plinary Rules promulgated by the highest court of any jurisdiction.

112

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

II.

[Vol. 20:103

THE LEGISLATION

This section will describe the legislature's deliberative process
and will then present a statute that reflects the legislature's resolu
tion of the issues. Sections III and IV then interpret and apply the
statute. As part of the legislative process, our hypotheticallegisla
ture received a briefing on the Stropnicky decision and held hear
ings on the issue of lawyer discrimination. It thus acquired a
considerable amount of background information on matters such as
the professional standards of the legal profession and other profes
sions governing discrimination against clients, the existing federal
laws governing such discrimination, and the social facts concerning
nature and extent of such discrimination. The legislators were sur
prised to learn that, even though no other profession permits dis
crimination against clients and federal law likely prohibits at least
some forms, the professional standards of the legal profession not
only do not explicitly prohibit lawyers from discriminating against
clients but actually permit such discrimination,27 The legislators
learned that the legal profession is alone in its policy of permitting
discrimination and that the professional standards governing doc
tors and psychiatrists (and most other professions and occupations)
explicitly prohibit discrimination. 28 The briefing also informed th,e
27. This freedom to discriminate is one small part of what Professor Wolfram
calls the "Orthodoxy of Professional Freedom to Choose Clients." Id. at 573. In exer
cising this general freedom, "a lawyer may refuse to represent a client for any reason at
all-because the client cannot pay the lawyer's demanded fee; because the client is not
of the lawyer's race or socioeconomic status; because the client is weird or not, tall or
short, thin or fat, moral or immoral." Id. Professor Chin further elaborates and de
fends this traditional view of the lawyer's freedom to discriminate. See Gabriel J. Chin,
Do You Really Want a Lawyer Who Doesn't Want You?, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 9
(1998).
28. See, e.g., AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, ETHICS MANUAL, reprinted in
CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 239, 241 (Rena A. Gorlin ed., 3d ed. 1994)
("Confidentiality respects the privacy of patients, ... and prevents discrimination based
on their medical condition."); AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF ETH
ICS AND CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuer, reprinted in CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RE
SPONSIBILITY, supra, at 219, 219 ("[D]entists shall not refuse to accept patients into
their practice or deny dental service to patients because of the patient's race, creed,
color, sex, or national origin."); AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CODE OF MEDI
CAL ETIllCS AND CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL
AFFAIRS, reprinted in CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra, at 265, 327
("[P]hysicians who offer their services to the public may not decline to accept patients
because of race, color, religion, national origin, or any other basis that would constitute
invidious discrimination."); AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF
MEDICAL ETHICS WITH ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY, re
printed in CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra, at 349, 354 ("A physician
shall, in the provision of appropriate patient care, except in emergencies, be free to
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legislators of two federal statutes-the 1990 Americans with Disa
bility Act29 and a section of the Reconstruction Era Civil Rights
Act, amended in 1991 30-that probably make disability or race dis
crimination by lawyers unlawful.3 1
The legislators were even more surprised by the traditional ra
tionale for permitting attorney discrimination. As reported to
them, the legal profession permits such discrimination because of
the risk that strong personal feelings might prevent the lawyer from
complying with his or her duties of loyalty to and zealous represen
tation of the client. This rationale astonished the legislators, who
thought that a primary reason for professional standards, in any
profession, was to guide and even to force otherwise unacceptable
personal behavior into conformity with professional norms. They
were startled to find the legal profession following the reverse pol
icy and bending professional norms to accommodate unacceptable
personal behavior. The legislature found the rationale for the tradi
tional rule-even when burnished by Professor Chin's spirited de
fense and elaboration32-wholly unconvincing.
The legislative briefing contained two other features: a report
on the extent and severity of the problem of discrimination by law
yers and a discussion of possible justifications for what might be
choose whom to serve ...."); AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDuer, reprinted in CODES OF PRo·
FESSIONAL REsPONSmILITY, supra, at 359, 364 ("[P]sychologists do not engage in unfair
discrimination based on age, gender, race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual
orientation, disability, socioeconomic status, or any basis proscribed by law.").
29. 42 V.S.c. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
30. 42 V.S.c. § 1981 (1994).
31. With respect to disability discrimination, the ADA forbids disability discrimi
nation in, among other situations, a place of public accommodation and defines an of
fice as a place of public accommodation. See 42 V.S.c. § 12181(7)(F). Although there
are as yet no reported cases, it seems quite clear that the ADA would apply to discrimi
nation by a lawyer based on a prospective client's disability. See Frierson, supra note
17, at 402. The statute clearly applies to discrimination in the provision of medical
services. See Jairath v. Dyer, 972 F. Supp. 1461 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (doctor);- A.R. v. Ko
gan, 964 F. Supp. 269 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (doctor); Abbot v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580 (D.
Me. 1995) (dentist).
With respect to racial discrimination, while I agree with Professor Chin that no
cases have yet applied § 1981 to the attorney-client contractual relationship, I draw no
interpretive message from that fact. It seems to me that a statute that gives "all persons
within the jurisdiction of the Vnited States ... the same right ... to make and enforce
contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens," 42 V.S.c. § 1981(a), would give a black
prospective client the same right to make and enforce a lawyer-client contract as a
white person, see Begg, supra note 3, at 329-35 (discussing application of § 1981 to
lawyer-client contracts).
32. See Chin, supra note 27.
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called "affirmative" forms of discrimination, as practiced by Judith
Nathanson and other lawyers. Reviewing a number of recent stud
ies on discrimination in the legal profession,33 the staff reported
that the problem of lawyer discrimination against clients was not
particularly widespread or severe. The studies discussed many
types of discrimination and especially noted barriers to the entry of
minorities and women into the professions and the treatment of mi
nority and women once they have entered the profession. While
documenting these problems and suggesting several solutions, it is
noteworthy that these reports did not even mention, let alone dis
cussed, the problem of discriminatory refusal to accept clients. The
staff offered the informal, anecdotal opinion that most lawyers do
not discriminate but instead offer their professional services to all
paying clients and that money-not discrimination-is the barrier
preventing some minorities, women or other protected classes from
obtaining needed legal services.
On the other hand, the report also noted anecdotal and histori
cal evidence of discrimination. Anecdotally, the staff had received
reports of blatant discrimination, such as lawyers who will not rep
resent African-Americans because of racial animus or homosexual
men or women because of homophobia. It has read of the refusal
of doctors, dentists and lawyers to serve people infected with the
HIV virus 34 and knows that Congress found disability discrimina
tion by businesses and professionals (including lawyers and doctors)
33. Numerous recent commissions and committees have studied discrimination
(primarily racial and sexual) in the legal profession. The subsequent reports have fo
cused on either access to the p!,"ofession (through law school admissions and law firm
hiring) or discrimination against witnesses and adverse parties in litigation and negotia
tion methods and tactics. See, e.g., Albert H. Cantril, Agenda for Access: The American

People and Civil Justice, Final Report on the Implications of the Comprehensive Legal
Needs Study, 1996 AB.A CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVS. AND THE PUB.; CIVIL JUS·
TICE: AN AGENDA FOR THE 1990s, PAPERS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION NA·
TIONAL CONFERENCE ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN THE 1990s (Esther F. Lardent ed.,
AB.A 1989); Barbara A Curran, Women in the Law: A Look at the Numbers, in 1995
A.B.A. COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION; CYNTHIA FUCHS EpSTEIN, WOMEN IN
LAW (University of Illinois Press 2d ed. 1993) (1981); BERNARD F. LENTZ & DAVID N.
LABAND, SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1995); PROCEEDINGS OF
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS (Dixie K. Knoebel &
Marilyn McCoy Roberts eds., National Center for State Courts 1990); LYNN HECHT
SCHAFRAN, WOMEN'S JUDGES' FUND FOR JUSTICE, PROMOTING GENDER FAIRNESS
THROUGH JUDICIAL EDUCATION: A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES AND RESOURCES (1989);
Women and the ABA: A History of Women's Bar Association, 1965-1989, 1989 AB.A
COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION.
34. See, e.g., Elstein v. State Div. of Human Rights, 555 N.Y.S.2d 516 (App. Div.
1990) (preliminary finding of discrimination by a medical doctor who refused to treat
AIDS patient). See generally Robert T. Begg, Legal Ethics and AIDS: An Analysis of
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in places of public accommodation prior to enacting the Americans
with Disabilities AcP5 in 1990. On the historical side, the legisla
ture is also aware of past patterns of discrimination, including
WASP law firms refusing to represent Jewish, Irish-American and
Italo-American clients and of racial and religious discrimination in
the legal and medical professions.
After discussing this report, the legislature agreed that any bla
tant discrimination that does occur is harmful and wrong and
should be declared unlawful. In addition to the economic losses,
such discrimination also inflicts a dignitary harm upon the victim
and an assault on society's commitment to nondiscrimination. Even
if lawyer discrimination is not widespread, a rule permitting dis
crimination in the legal profession sends precisely the wrong
message about both the legal profession and society's views about
discrimination. The legislature decided to replace the traditional
rule with a rule explicitly prohibiting discrimination, if only for sym
bolic reasons. Laws against discrimination require everyone else
employers, landlords, bankers-to control their personal prefer
ences when conducting a regulated business. It is not too much to
require lawyers to obey these same laws. 36
On the other hand, the legislature also thought it appropriate
to recognize certain narrow affirmative defenses. Just as an em
ployer is permitted to discriminate if it can prove that such discrimi
nation is a bona fide occupational qualification, the legislature
believed that a lawyer (like any other professional) should be per
mitted to discriminate if he or she could prove that such discrimina
tion is necessary to the practice of the profession, as determined by
the professional standards of that profession. In this regard, the
legislature noted that lawyers in practice often specialize in many
different ways, including their choice of clients and issues. The leg
islature did not want to disturb these practices, as it understood
Selected Issues, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (1989); American Bar Association, American
Bar Association Policy on AIDS, 21 U. ToL. L. REv. 9 (1989).
35. 42 U.S.c. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). The ADA explicitly defined professional
offices as places of public accommodation subject to the statute's prohibition against
discrimination. See id. § 12181(7)(F).
36. The legislature also considered and rejected an argument that the prohibition
would be unworkable, would undermine the lawyer-client relationship, and would lead
to a flood of frivolous and vexatious claims. These potential problems beset all discrim
ination laws, indeed all forms of legal regulation. Employers, landlords and other sub
jects of such regulation have all made the same objections, which society has
consistently rejected. It is both unpersuasive and unseemly for lawyers to insist that
enforcement costs and consequences should exempt them, and no one else.
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them. Some lawyers represent only plaintiffs and others only de
fendants in personal injury work; some exclusively management
and others exclusively labor in employment law. Even more to the
legislature's point, longstanding and important legal advocacy
groups, such as the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the ACLU, The
ACLU Women's Rights Project and the NOW Legal Defense Fund
specialize in representing the interests of certain groups and ideas.
The legislature's understanding was that these lawyers do not dis
criminate on the basis of race, sex or any other prohibited charac
teristic when they decide which clients to accept and to reject. 37
Instead, they base their client-representation decisions on facts and
issues raised in particular cases and the congruence of those facts
and issues with their practice, strategy and legal and ideological be
liefs. The legislature also understood, however, that some of the
legal defense organizations may at times consider the race or sex of
a prospective client in determining the types of arguments they
would be willing to advance on behalf of that client. The legislature
did not intend its new law to change what it understood to be these
current practices and expected the affirmative defenses to apply to
any distinctions and discriminations that they might make in issue
and argument selection.
The legislature also decided to recognize an affirmative de
fense based on constitutional law, permitting the discriminating at
torney to avoid liability if he or she proves that prohibiting the
discrimination would violate a constitutional right. The legislative
report noted that the interpretation of the constitutional issues
would be closely related to the interpretation of professional stan
dards governing the practice of law. The legislature included the
constitutional affirmative defense in the statute to assure that the
administrative agency charged with the initial fact-finding and inter
pretation will engage the constitutional issues together with the is
sues concerning professional standards and the appropriate role of
lawyers.
With respect to the affirmative defenses, the legislature created
an explicit legislative history to document its legislative intent that
the affirmative defenses were to be narrow and infrequent excep
tions to the general rule prohibiting discrimination. The legislature
intended to override the legal profession's traditional rule permit
37. I describe the nondiscriminatory practices of these groups as the legislature's
background understanding (whether true or not). I believe the description to be true as
a matter of social fact but do not presently have documentation for my belief.
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ting discrimination and to replace it with a general rule prohibiting
discrimination and did not intend to permit the legal profession's
traditional rule to reemerge as an affirmative defense. The legisla
ture intended that the affirmative defense would be used only for
determining the legality of "affirmative" discrimination. The legis
lature found that discrimination like Attorney Nathanson's, moti
vated not by discriminatory animus but by specialized work on
behalf of a historically-disadvantaged class, raised many difficult is
sues. The legislature's discussion of "affirmative" discrimination
echoed the rhetoric of the affirmative action debates, with some
legislators supporting a rule of sexblindness (and colorblindness)
and others supporting a flexible, asymmetrical standard that would
permit exceptions for some actions designed to assist members of
historically subordinated groups.
The discussion was unsatisfyingly abstract and the legislature
was unable to reach agreement. It decided that the issue would be
more appropriately discussed and resolved in the context of actual
cases and thus decided to permit the regulatory agency to deter
mine the circumstances, if any, in which such discrimination could
be justified. However, the legislature established a strict standard
to control its delegation. It required the discriminating lawyer to
persuade the regulatory agency that the discrimination was neces
sary to the practice of law and, as a way of underlining the standard
of necessity, to prove that there was no less discriminatory means of
achieving the same goal. Further, the legislature expressed its in
tention that the required necessity was to be measured not by the
idiosyncratic practice of any individual lawyer but against the pro
fessional standards for the practice of law applicable to the entire
profession. Finally, the legislature decided to require a lawyer
wishing to discriminate to present a written request, in advance of
any discrimination, to the state body that regulates lawyers. The
prior written request will encourage the individual lawyer to think
seriously about the reasons for the proposed discrimination and to
discuss those reasons with a professional body.
After concluding its deliberations, the legislature prepared a
statute incorporating its decisions. The substantive portions38 of
that statute provide:

38. Any discrimination statute would also have procedural requirements, en
forcement provisions and a remedies section. While important in any regulatory re
gime, they are beyond the scope of this essay.
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Non-Discrimination in Licensed Occupations39
l(A) It shall be an unlawful practice for the holder of any occu
pational or professional license issued by the State to prac
tice or to perform any occupation or profession to
discriminate in any way against an actual or potential cus
tomer, client or patient because of that person's race, color,
national origin, religion, sex or disability;
(B) Notwithstanding § l(A), it shall not be an unlawful practice
if the holder of the license demonstrates that it qualifies for
an affirmative defense, by persuading the agency that is
sued the license that:
1) the discrimination is a bona fide occupational or profes
sional qualification necessary to the normal operation or
practice of the occupation or profession and that there is
no less discriminatory way to practice the occupation or
profession; or
2) the prohibition of such discrimination would violate the
constitutional rights of the holder of the license.
(C) The holder of a license wishing to establish an affirmative
defense under § l(B) must first apply to the agency that
issued the license, setting forth with particularity the nature
of the discrimination in which the holder wishes to engage,
the affirmative defense(s) it wishes to establish and the rea
sons that support its claim for the affirmative defense(s).

III.

INTERPRETING THE STATUTE AND ITS .AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES

This section will interpret the statute and its affirmative de
fenses. The statute establishes a clear starting point and a directed
method of analysis. Under the statute, treating a client or prospec
tive client differently because of a proscribed characteristic is pre
sumptively unlawful, subject to the affirmative defenses based on
professional standards or constitutional rights. Each of the six at
torneys has in fact treated a client or prospective client differently
because of race or sex. Therefore, under the statute, the conduct of
all six attorneys is unlawful unless protected by an affirmative
defense.
39. Although the impetus for the statute was lawyer discrimination, the statute
applies to all licensed occupations. By adopting a uniform rule, the legislature sought to
reaffirm the strong social policy against discrimination and to treat any differences be
tween the professions and occupations in the context of affirmative defenses to the
general rule.
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Before applying the affirmative defenses to the six individual
cases in Section IV, this section will discuss the general considera
tions that inform those specific applications, first for the profes
sional standards and then the constitutional affirmative defenses.
In determining whether lawyer discrimination is necessary to the
practice of law or required as a matter of constitutional right, I ex
amine different perspectives on the practice of law, the role of law
yers and the rights of clients. I conclude that discrimination in the
selection and rejection of clients cannot be justified but both profes
sional standards and constitutional law support the freedom of the
lawyer to use the race or sex of the client as a factor in interpreting
the law and deciding which arguments to make on behalf of a client.
A.

Discrimination Justified by Professional Standards

To establish an affirmative defense based on professional stan
dards, the lawyer must prove that discrimination based on race or
sex is necessary to the practice of law. Given that the affirmative
defenses will be "narrowly construed"40 and that the proponent has
the burden of persuasion, this affirmative defense will be difficult
and, for outright client rejection, impossible-to establish. In the
practice of law, lawyers provide legal services to resolve their cli
ent's legal problems. 41 In doing so, lawyers use the particular
knowledge, skills and values of the legal profession. The most com
plete recent inventory of the skills and values of the practicing at
torney is the Macerate Report. 42 That report gives no support to
the claim that discrimination in client selection in order to have cli
40. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977); see also International Union,
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187,201 (1991) ("Our emphasis on the restric
tive scope of the BFOQ defense is grounded on both the language and the legislative
history of § 703.").
41. Lawyers also serve other functions and provide other services-publicists,
lobbyists, friends and so on. However, these additional functions are subsidiary to and
directed toward the core function of providing legal services as defined by the profes
sional standards of the legal profession.
42. See Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession, Legal Education and Pro
fessional Development: An Educational Continuum, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. &
ADMISSIONS TO BAR (chaired by Robert McCrate). The Report describes "the skills
and values with which a well-trained generalist should be familiar before assuming ulti
mate responsibility for a client ... [and which are required] to practice law competently
and professionally." [d. at 125. The ten skills are problem-solving, legal analysis and
reasoning, legal research, factual investigation, communication, counseling, negotiation,
litigation and ADR procedures, organization and management of legal work, and rec
ognizing and solving ethical dilemmas. See id. at 135. The four values are competent
representation, promoting justice, fairness and morality, striving to improve the profes
sion, and professional self-development. See id. at 136.
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ents of a particular race or sex is in any way necessary to the prac
tice of law.
1.

Outright Client Rejection

While rejecting the traditional interpretation,43 the legislature
specifically left open the question of whether "affirmative" discrim
ination could be necessary to the practice of law. Attorneys such as
Judith Nathanson and Lawyer 6 believe that a strong personal rela
tionship-a bonding and a feeling of attachment and solidarity
between the lawyer and client is essential to their practice of law,
and assert that the strong personal relationship is possible only with
clients of a particular race or sex. They also devote (at least part of)
their legal practice to a particular cause, such as achieving equal
rights or economic justice for a particular group, and want to repre
sent only clients who are members of that group.
The decision on whether "affirmative" discrimination is neces
sary to the practice of law of course depends on a conception of
legal practice and the lawyer's role. None of several common views
of the lawyer-as a "hired gun," as counselor, as fiduciary and as an
officer of the court-support the claim that "affirmative" discrimi
nation is necessary to the practice of law. As a hired gun (or agent
for the principal, the client), the attorney is selling his or her legal
expertise in the marketplace, similar to any other tradesperson, and
the law regularly regulates tradespeople as they sell their services.
As counselor, the attorney discusses matters with the client and
gives both legal and non-legal advice. 44 However, the fact that
other professionals (including psychiatrists and social workers) en
gage in counseling while prohibited from discriminating against cli
ents undermines the claim that such discrimination is necessary. As
fiduciary, the lawyer has a special obligation to respect and to pro
tect the trust and confidences of the client. While that obligation
surely supports some lawyer discretion in selecting the clients to
whom he or she will owe that obligation, it does not establish racial
or sexual discrimination as a necessary element of that discretion.
Finally, as officer of the court, a thick system of external rules gov
43. That interpretation permitted discrimination by lawyers due to the risk that
strong personal feelings might compromise the duties of loyalty to and zealous repre
sentation of the client. The rejection reflects the view that, in the course of their profes
sional work, professionals must control their personal feelings and conform their
professional conduct to proscribed external standards, including nondiscrimination.
44. See generally WOLFRAM, supra note 26, at 687-770.
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ems the lawyer's conduct and speech, and adding a rule prohibiting
discrimination is not inconsistent with that role.
Two other perspectives might justify the claim that discrimina
tion is necessary to the practice of law: the need to respect the au
tonomy of the individual lawyer, and the need to respect the
decisions of the client. There are two versions of the lawyer auton
omy argument, one based on the lawyer's desire for bonding in the
lawyer-client relationship and the other based on the lawyer's free
dom to advance social causes. The first version of the lawyer auton
omy argument derives from the individual lawyer's belief that a
close attachment with a client is necessary for the effective practice
of law. If the lawyer further believes that he or she can only
achieve that close attachment with clients of a certain race or sex,
then the legal profession should respect that belief and permit the
discrimination in order to permit the effective practice of law. This
argument has some resonance, trading as it does on the attractive
ness and value of positive lawyer-client relationships. Such rela
tionships are indeed wonderful and deeply satisfying and, often, the
most instrumentally effective. We instinctively understand both
their power and their fragility and want to foster and protect those
relationships. Maximizing lawyer freedom-including the freedom
to discriminate-is one way to foster (and avoid jeopardizing) those
relationships.
While I too value strong lawyer-client relationships, discrimi
nation is hardly necessary to the achievement of strong bonds, and
it is unwise to permit discrimination as a means for achieving them.
Lawyers can and do have satisfying and successful relationships
across gender, racial, religious and other lines and should be en
couraged-indeed, required-to develop the skills and commit
ment necessary to do so. The contrary belief-that discrimination
is necessary for successful client relationships and that prohibiting
discrimination would make such relationships impossible-is an
other example of what I earlier called "lawyer exceptionalism," the
belief that lawyers are special and require different rules. If psycho
therapists, bartenders and many others can establish effective pro
fessional relationships under a regime of nondiscrimination, lawyers
can too. This "discrimination for bonding" rationale is too similar
to the "negative personal feelings" rationale for the traditionally
permitted discrimination. Both rationales are unacceptable for the
same basic reason: in the practice of a profession, professional stan
dards (including nondiscrimination) should control contrary con
duct motivated by personal feelings.
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A second version of the lawyer autonomy argument is that, in
the practice of law, lawyers must have the freedom to work on be
half of particular causes and that their work on behalf of this or that
cause justifies client discrimination. This argument confuses ends
and means and eliminates a necessary distinction between personal
and professional roles. A lawyer of course has the right, both as an
individual and as a licensed professional, to work on behalf of any
cause he or she wishes to support, including the advancement of
women or further economic and social progress for African-Ameri
cans. But the means that the lawyer uses to pursue those ends must
be lawful. The lawyer as an individual has wide latitude in deciding
how to achieve those ends and can choose with whom and for
whom to work on those activities, using whatever criteria he or she
wishes to use. In the practice of law and the representation of cli
ents, however, the lawyer's role is constrained by a number of legal
requirements and professional standards, and the· prohibition
against client discrimination is another such requirement. In my
opinion, using the serve-the-cause rationale to permit discrimina
tion would be a serious mistake. It would authorize and justify vir
tually every kind of discrimination, for and against any type of
racial, ethnic, religious or sexual group. It would be unwise and
inconsistent with the policy choice reflected in the legislation. As
shown by the examples of the NAACP and NOW Legal Defense
Funds and others, it is also unnecessary.
The other possible justification for lawyer discrimination is cli
ent-based, grounded in the needs and rights of the client, not the
autonomy of the lawyer. The client-based argument asserts that
lawyers must discriminate against some people in order to meet the
needs of those who want to be represented by an attorney with
whom the client can "really" identify because 1;Ie or she represents
"only people like me." Client choice is an important value, but us
ing it to justify attorney discrimination simply takes it too far.
As a general matter, clients as private individuals can lawfully
discriminate. As individuals,45 they can use any reason to select or
to reject an attorney (or electrician or doctor), including race or
sex. Female clients can, and often do, select a woman lawyer (or
electrician or doctor), and the same can be said for males, whites,
blacks and people of all religious persuasions. No law regulates
45. While not perfectly clear as a matter of positive law, it is unlikely that a· busi
ness client has a similar right to discriminate, at least on the basis of disability or race.
See 42 U.S.c. §§ 12101-12213 (1994); 42 U.S.c. § 1981 (1994).
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such individual client choice, and any such law would be undesir
able, unworkable and probably unconstitutional as an infringement
on personal autonomy.
The principle of personal autonomy which supports this client
choice and freedom to discriminate does not, however, support the
stronger right to select, and to have available for selection, a "pure"
attorney, one who represents only clients of one race or sex. This
broader justification for a lawyer's right to discriminate clashes too
sharply with the principle of nondiscrimination. A recycled version
of the "customer preference" defense that has been soundly re
jected in most employment discrimination cases,46. this argument
sweeps too broadly and depends too strongly on entrenched and
established patterns of racial and social interaction that the laws
against discrimination were designed to eliminate. 47
.
The discussion of professional standards thus far has focused
on claims that lawyer freedom to select clients of a particular race
or sex is necessary to the practice of law: After examining argu
ments based on the lawyer's role and on a client's rights, it has con
cluded that the legislative standard for justifying a discriminatory
46. See, e.g., Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 609 (9th Cir.
1982) (the airline passengers' preference for female flight attendants cannot establish a
BFOQ); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1981) (the fact
that the employer's South American clients would refuse to deal with women officers is
not a basis for establishing a BFOQ); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d
385,389 (5th Cir. 1971) (the "pleasant environment" and "cosmetic effect" provided by
female flight attendants was tangential to the airline's primary function); Vigars v. Val
ley Christian Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 802, 808 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (the preference of parents
whose children attended school did not establish a BFOQ for the school prohibiting
unwed pregnant employees); Bollenbach v. Board of Educ., 659 F. Supp. 1450, 1472
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (Hasidic clientele's preference for male bus drivers does not establish a
BFOQ); Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 393 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (the
airline passengers' preference for female flight attendants cannot establish a BFOQ; the
duties of attracting and entertaining male passengers and fulfilling customer expecta
tions for female service are tangential to the essence of a flight attendant job).
47. As an example of laws relying on customer preferences to justify sex discrimi
nation, several states, including Massachusetts, have recently amended their public ac
commodation statutes to permit health and fitness clubs to discriminate on the basis of
sex, thus legalizing all-female and all-male health clubs. See 1998 Mass. Legis. Servo ch.
19 (West); ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/5-103 (West 1993) ("Nothing in this Article shall
apply to ... [a]ny facility, as to discrimination based on sex, which is distinctly private in
nature such as ... health clubs ...."); see also Livingwell (North) Inc. V. Pemlsylvania
Human Relations Comm'n, 606 A.2d 1287, 1294 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).(sex is a bona
fide public accommodation qualification for members of a women's health club). Legis
latures approving these amendments believed that,.in the context of health clubs, pro
tecting the privacy interests of customers was more important than enforcing the
prohibition against discrimination. The sharp focus and narrow tailoring of this exemp
tion has given it an appeal unlikely to exist for clients of legal services.
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refusal to represent a client has not been met. When the decision
maker (in this essay, the legislature) rejects the traditional "strong
personal feelings" as a rationale and requires that discrimination be
necessary to the practice of law, the remaining arguments in sup
port of such discrimination also collapse.
2.

Reasonable Limitations on Issues and Arguments

However, while providing no defense to outright discrimina
tion, professional standards do justify the lawyer's use of the race or
sex of a client in deciding the issues and arguments the lawyer is
willing to raise on behalf of that client. To step outside of the fam
ily law area, take the example of a lawyer who specializes in repre
senting plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases. Assuming an
appropriate factual basis, professional standards will require the
lawyer representing· a black or female plaintiff in a Title VII em
ployment discrimination case to make a claim of disparate impact
discrimination48 (and would find the lawyer professionally negligent
if he or she did not make that claim). However, in discussing the
possible representation of a white or male plaintiff in an employ
ment case with otherwise-identical facts, that same lawyer should
be allowed, if he or she desires, to inform the potential client that
he or she will not make a disparate impact argument on behalf of
the white or male client. The basis for the refusal to make the argu
ment is the attorney's reasonable legal opinion that, because the
disparate impact theory of discrimination is designed to remedy
past discrimination against historically-subordinated groups, only
members of such groups can properly assert disparate impact
claims. This view of the disparate impact claim is a reasonable and
probably even the correct view, but it is by no means the only rea
sonable interpretation and is not authoritatively established. 49 A
48. The disparate impact theory of discrimination enables a plaintiff to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination by proving that practices neutral on their face and in
their motivation have a statistically significant disparate impact on the plaintiff's pro
tected group. First announced by a unanimous court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971), the theory was codified at 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) as a result of
Section 105(a) of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. For a general discussion of the disparate
impact theory, see BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, AMERICAN BAR Asso
CIATION, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 81-114 (Paul W. Cane, Jr., ed., 3d ed.
1996).
49. Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue, language
in two cases suggests that the disparate impact theory is limited to members of certain
groups. Even while deciding that one of the purposes of Title VII was to protect the
employment opportunities of individuals (and thus rejecting the employer's group-ori
ented bottom-line defense), the Court nevertheless said that the disparate impact the
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different lawyer could reasonably assert a disparate impact claim on
behalf of a male or white client. Presenting the claim would cer
tainly not violate Rule 11, and the claim might even win. The plain
tiff-oriented attorney's legal interpretation is reasonable and legally
justified but by no means legally compelled.
Nevertheless, if there is full disclosure to the client, a lawyer
has the right and professional obligation to exercise reasonable per
sonal judgment in the interpretation of the law and in the use of
that interpretation. The right to exercise reasonable personal judg
ment in the interpretation of the law is necessary to the practice of
law and thus justified by the affirmative defense. 50
On the other hand, this right is limited, with the limits set by
the prevailing professional standard for determining the reasona
bleness of arguments and claims. For example, it would be unrea
sonable for the plaintiff's attorney in our example to tell that white
prospective client that the law does not support a disparate treat
ment (as opposed to a disparate impact) claim on behalf of a white
employee. The Supreme Court case of McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co. 51 authoritatively established that Title VII pro
hibits employers from such disparate treatment discrimination
against both white and black employees. The attorney's refusal to
present such a claim on such a basis would be unreasonable and not
permitted. On the other hand, the employer might claim that its
admittedly disparate treatment of the white employee was justified
ory applied when a "nonjob-related barrier . . . has a significant adverse effect on
minorities or women . ..." Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448 (1982) (emphasis
added). In the first pension sex discrimination case of Los Angeles Department of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), the Court suggested in a footnote that
an employment practice that had a disparate impact on men might not have the same
legal consequences as one that had such an impact on women. See id. at 710 n.20.
Commentators have noted that the issue is unresolved. See III CHARLES A. SULLIVAN
ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 4.2.2 (2d ed. 1988); Pamela L. Perry, Balanc
ing Equal Employment Opponunities with Employers' Legitimate Discretion: The Busi
ness Necessity Response to Disparate Impact Discrimination Under Title VIJ, 12 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 1, 10 n.33 (1990). I have found only one case permitting a white plaintiff to
bring a race-based disparate impact challenge and the defendant in that case was a
historically-black university that had been previously found liable for racial discrimina
tion against whites. See Craig v. Alabama State Univ., 804 F.2d 682, 688 (11th Cir.
1986). In recognizing the disparate impact claim by the white female plaintiff, the court
repeatedly said that the claim could be used to remedy discrimination against "minori
ties," a term which the court used in reference to the plaintiff. Id. at 685, 688.
50. This right is a defense to the discrimination charge. If the client retains an
attorney after the disclosure, the right also provides a defense to a malpractice claim.
51. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
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by a lawful affirmative action plan. 52 Given the uncertainty and dif
ficulty of the law in this area, the attorney might reasonably decide
not to challenge the employer's affirmative action, on at least two
possible grounds. The attorney might believe that the employer's
plan is legal (although another attorney might assess the same law
and the same facts and come to a different conclusion). Or the at
torney might decide that litigation involving a challenge to an af
firmative action plan is a specialized area of practice, one that the
attorney is not prepared to engage. The attorney would then ex
tend the white prospective client an offer of conditional representa
tion, agreeing to represent him but not to present a disparate
impact claim or to challenge the employer's affirmative action plan.
The prospective client would then decide to accept or to reject the
offer.
3. The Offer of Conditional Representation
The affirmative defense based on professional standards thus
yields the following result: outright rejection-no; reasonable limi
tations on issues and arguments-yes. The prohibition against dis
crimination forbids the plaintiff-oriented civil rights attorney from
rejecting the white or male client because of his race. The attorney
cannot have a "black-only" or "women-only" criterion for selecting
clients. However, the lawyer can make an offer of "conditional rep
resentation," in which representation is conditional upon the client
accepting the fact that the lawyer will not make certain arguments
or raise certain claims or defenses.
This concept. of . "conditional representation" is a necessary
consequence of a regime that prohibits outright client rejection but
permits discrimination in issues and arguments. As a concept born
of compromise, it is an initially unattractive technique, and its de
fects need to be considered in any evaluation of my suggested ap
proach. "Conditional representation" is sharply at odds with the
traditional view of the unconditional, hold-nothing-back commit
ment entailed in client representation. It sends a mixed message to
the client: "I'll represent you, but I won't do everything that I law
fully can to accomplish your goals. I will hold back, because my
52. As presently permitted (however tenuously) under Title VII by Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), and United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193 (1979). The constitutional standard for measuring such plans is now "strict scru
tiny." See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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personal principles are more important than your case." This is ad
mittedly not an attractive view of the attorney-client relationship.
The response to this criticism is confession and avoidance
rather than denial. Despite its admitted flaws, we should still sup
port conditional representation because, as Churchill said of de
mocracy, it is better than the alternatives. 53 One can avoid the
problem of conditional representation only by adopting an uncondi
tional rule, one that either permits all or prohibits all discrimina
tion. Under the traditional rule, permitting all discrimination, the
attorney's message to the prospective client is clear- "I won't rep
resent you because you are black"-but the clarity is purchased at a
high price. The clear message inflicts harm on an innocent individ
ual and undermines both support for the principle of nondiscrimi
nation and respect for the legal profession. On the other hand, the
California rule or the MCAD interpretation prohibiting all discrim
ination sends a clear but unacceptable message to attorneys: "Your
thoughts and interpretations don't matter. You are automatons
whose only job is to advance all plausible claims, regardless of what
you think about them." This view is equally unacceptable. It em
bodies an objectionably narrow view of the lawyer's role and would
invalidate well-established legal practices, traditionally used by or
ganizations like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the NOW
Legal Defense and Education Fund.
Conditional representation is a necessary consequence of a
middle view that seeks to accommodate both the prohibition
against discrimination and a lawyer's legitimate professional auton
omy. Further, it is unlikely to present a major problem in practice,
because there will be relatively few offers of conditional representa
tion and even fewer acceptances. 54 If (as may very well have been
the case with Mr. Stropnicky) the client seeks the attorney precisely
for the attorney's value in presenting a particular argument or issue,
and the attorney legitimately refuses to present that argument or
issue, that client will then likely reject the offer of conditional rep
resentation. However, it makes sense to keep the power of rejec
53. "No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been
said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that
have been tried from time to time." Winston Churchill, House of Commons (Nov. 11,
1947), in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 150 (3d ed. 1979).
54. Once the groundrules become established, it seems likely that few attorneys
will request, and fewer yet will receive, approval to limit the presentation of issues or
arguments, and the types of issues and arguments will soon become standardized. Fur
ther, as discussed in the text, many clients will reject the offer of such representation.
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tion in the hands of the client, and not the lawyer, because the
client has the initial information on his or her legal needs and is
better situated to decide whether this or that attorney can best meet
those needs.
B.

Discrimination as a Constitutional Right

The second statutory affirmative defense applies a defense if
the enforcement of the prohibition against discrimination violates a
constitutional right. Three related constitutional rights are arguably
at issue: the right of free expression, the right of association, and
the right not to be compelled to say what you do not want to say.
My discussion of these issues will be brief and conclusory, as the
essay has already grown well beyond its intended scope. 1 conclude
that the constitutional arguments do not justify outright rejection of
a client but can help to support and to explain the right of a lawyer
to exercise reasonable professional judgment in deciding what argu
ments to make (or not to make) on behalf of a client.
The first constitutional defense is a straightforward argument
that the statute impermissibly regulates speech. The statute sub
jects a lawyer's speech to financial penalty and injunction, based on
the content of her speech. As an example, Judith Nathanson wants
to say to Mr. Stropnicky, "I will not represent you because you are
a man and 1 specialize in representing women," and to her female
clientele, "I represent only women." The statute's prohibition
makes both statements untrue,55 and general commercial law pro
hibits the making of untrue statements. Thus, in combination with
general commercial law, the statute does in fact abridge her free
dom of free speech, making it unlawful for Judith Nathanson to say
what she wants to say. However, this type of abridgement is a stan
dard feature of most regulatory statutes and does not violate the
Constitution.
The second possible constitutional right to discriminate is
based on the right of association, an aspect of personal autonomy
and choice which protects the right to chose one's friends, house
guests and marriage partners, free of most state-imposed con
straints or requirements. Given the intense and personal nature of
the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney might claim an analogous
right to choose the clients with whom to associate, free of statutory
requirements. However, the attorney-client relationship is more
55. If the statute applies, she cannot refuse to represent Mr. Stropnicky because
he is a man, and cannot represent only women.
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professional than personal, and the attorney's right to choose (both
to select and to reject) clients is already subject to government reg
ulation and restraint that would be impossible to impose on purely
private relationships. Although rarely exercised, courts have the
right to force an attorney to represent (that is, to associate with) a
client, even over the attorney's objection. Further, ethical rules
governing conflicts and prior representation can prevent an attor
ney from representing (and thus associating with) a client that she
affirmatively wants to represent. These longstanding limits on the
lawyer's freedom of association are consistent with the· Supreme
Court's treatment of associational rights in Roberts v. United States
Jaycees,56 a case where Justice O'Connor wrote in her concurrence
that "[a] shopkeeper has no constitutional right to deal only with
persons of one sex."57 An attorney has a constitutional right freely
to choose her friends, but no constitutional right to choose her cli
ents (or her law associates or even her law partners).58
The final constitutional argument is that the operation of the
statute unconstitutionally compels an attorney to say things that he
or she does not wish to say, in violation of the attorney's right to
control his or her own speech (and silence). Skillfully developed by
Professor Harpaz,59 this argument reinforces the right of lawyers to
consider race and sex in deciding which arguments to make on be
half of a client. However, in my view, where the legal profession
itself has determined that such discrimination violates its profes
sional standards, it does not support a constitutional right to reject
clients.
Rather than review the cases and arguments carefully expli
cated in Professor Harpaz's essay, I will simply identify what I see
as the main point of weakness. The argument depends on an anal
ogy, and the analogy is simply not convincing. The differences be
tween the activity of a parade director in organizing and presenting
his parade and the work of an attorney in representing a client are
profound, and the law should wisely recognize these differences. In
case law shorthand, for speech purposes, Judith Nathanson is more
like Ollie McClung, the owner of Ollie's Barbeque,60 than "Wacko"
56. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
57. Id. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
58. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
59. See Leora Harpaz, Compelled Lawyer Representation and the Free Speech
Rights of Attorneys, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 49 (1998).
60. Ollie McClung, Sr. and Ollie McClung, Jr. were the father-and-son owners of
Ollie's Barbeque, a restaurant in Birmingham, Alabama, and the plaintiffs in the law
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Hurley, a member of the South Boston Allied War Veterans Coun
cil that organized the parade.61
First Amendment analysis looks carefully at the context in
which the regulated speech occurs, both to classify the level of pro
tection for the speech and to determine the nature and weight of
the government's interest. A parade is an example of strongly pro
tected speech, and the First Amendment prevents the government
from forcing a parade director (the holder of the speech right) to
include (or exclude) this or that group.62 While he is "performing"
his parade, the government cannot prevent him from saying what
he wants to say, cannot tell him what to say and cannot compel him
to share his parade or speech with others.
The speech of Ollie the restaurateur and Judith Nathanson the
lawyer occurs in a different context. In ways that would be impossi
ble with the parade director, the government can, in certain circum
stances and for certain purposes, prevent them from saying certain
things and can also tell them what to say. For example, the govern
ment can prevent Ollie from telling African-Americans that they
are not wanted in his restaurant and from using racial slurs when
taking their orders or serving their food. The government can com
pel Ollie to speak to black customers, to tell them the "specials" not
on the menu and to ask them what they would like to order.63 If
proven that Ollie said to every white patron, "Lovely to have you;
y'all come back now," and said nothing to blacks, and did so inten
suit that concluded in the Supreme Court case of Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964). In 1964, they brought an action in the federal district court to enjoin the Attor
ney General from enforcing, as against their family-owned business, the newly enacted
Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 u.s.c. § 2000-b (1994) (current codified ver
sion). In a per curiam decision, a three-judge court granted the injunction. See Mc
Clung v. Katzenbach, 233 F. Supp. 815 (N.D. Ala. 1964). That court noted as
"undisputed facts," id. at 817, that Ollie's Barbeque served meals in a "wholesome at
mosphere," id. at 825 n.3, to "white collar business people and family groups," id., and
primarily to "regular customers who are for the most part known to the plaintiffs." Id.
The McClungs "would not voluntarily serve meals to Negroes." Id.
61. "Wacko" Hurley is John J. Hurley, the only individual plaintiff identified in
the Supreme Court opinion in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
62. The unanimous Supreme Court opinion goes out of its way to emphasize the
classic speech context of the case. The opinion begins by describing the issue as
"whether Massachusetts may require private citizens who organize a parade to include
among the marchers a group imparting a message the organizers do not wish to con
vey." Id. at 559. The court then takes two pages to describe the 20,000 marchers that
often participate in, and the 1 million viewers that often watch, the parade. See id. at
560-62.
63. Prohibiting and imposing monetary penalties on this form of disparate treat
ment would constitute government compulsion.
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tionally to discriminate against blacks, the government could com
pel Ollie to say "Lovely to have you ..." to black patrons as well.
For purposes of analyzing the constitutional basis of a claimed
right to discriminate against clients, attorney speech in the context
of representing a client in the practice of law is closer to Ollie's
speech than to the parade director's. While a lawyer is obviously
different than a restaurateur or shopkeeper, the professional con
duct and speech of a lawyer can be and is extensively regulated, in a
way that the parade director's speech can not be and is not. As the
press conference 64 and solicitation cases65 and long-established lim
itations on attorney vouching66 demonstrate, the government can
directly prevent the attorney from saying some things that she
wants to say. Further, the government can sometimes force an at
torney to say things that she does not want to say67 and to represent
clients that she does not want to represent. 68
The right to protection from compelled speech depends on a
strong right-like the parade director's-to control one's speech.
An attorney has that right in her role as a citizen, organizing a
parade or giving a speech, but not in the practice of law governed
by the reasonable professional standards of the legal profession. 69

64. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
65. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995); Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). But see Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977)
(lawyer advertising that is not false or misleading is commercial speech protected by the
FIrst Amendment).
66. Notwithstanding the desire of the attorney and her client, an attorney is
prohibited from "vouching" her belief in her client's position. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDver Rule 3.4(e) (1994); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON
SIDILITY DR 7-106(C)(3) (1994); see also WOLFRAM, supra note 26, at 624. Thus, the
government can prevent the attorney from saying, "I believe from the bottom of my
heart that my client is telling the truth and that she is innocent."
67. See, e.g., Zuaderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (up
holding requirement that attorneys advertising that they accepted cases on contingency
disclose that clients might still be liable for substantial costs).
68. A court can require an attorney to represent a client, over the attorney's ob
jection. Also, in litigation, an attorney must receive the court's permission in order to
withdraw from representation. If that permission is denied, the court can require the
attorney to continue representing a client and, in that context, speak on behalf of the
client.
69. I do not develop the implications of the continuum of speech that ranges from
speech in the lawyer's office to speech in the courtroom or speech on behalf of a client
in other public contexts. These distinctions strike me as considerably less important
than the distinction between the roles and activities of the lawyer and the parade
director.
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ApPLYING THE STATUTE

This section will apply the statute to the conduct of the six at
torneys and conclude that the conduct of Lawyer 3 is lawful and
that the statute bars the conduct of Lawyers 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6. The
results for all but Lawyer 4 follow from the straightforward applica
tion of the general principles of interpretation developed in Section
III. The case of Lawyer 4 raises the additional issue of how to treat
conduct based on deeply held views, where such views cannot be
justified as reasonable professional judgments but are permissible
personal opinions based on religious or moral beliefs.
Lawyer 1 and Lawyer 2 are both white lawyers who refuse to
represent African-Americans because of a personal dislike of, and
desire not to associate with, black people. Both claim that "strong
personal feelings" of dislike of African-Americans would prevent
him from proving the zealous representation required by the pro
fessional standards. The only difference is their method of opera
tion: Lawyer 1 is honest and overt about his discrimination; Lawyer
2 is covert.
Lawyer 1 will comply with § l(C) of the statute and seek an
affirmative defense and the agency will deny his request. While
strong racist "personal feelings" were grounds for refusing to repre
sent a client under the prior law, they no longer suffice, as rejecting
the traditional view was the major point of the legislation. Lawyer
1 has no valid constitutional claims. He still has the right to speak
and freely to choose his dinner guests and golf partners. 70
Lawyer 2 is unlikely to request permission to discrimination
from the Board of Bar Overseers. Rejected clients will not know
that the reason for the rejection was racial or sexual and are un
likely to file a discrimination complaint. Even if they do, the com
plaint will be investigated and adjudicated under the difficult
Burdine standard71 and, as in employment cases, the clients will
often lose. The example of Lawyer 2 reflects two unhappy facts of
life that the statute is powerless to change: 1) that covert discrimi
nation is difficult to detect and eliminate; and 2) that people (even
lawyers) who lie sometimes get away with it.
While this example exposes a limitation on the statute's likely
effectiveness and enforceability, it is not, in my view, a reason for
70. Although, after Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984), he may not
choose his law partners as freely, at least in most circumstances.
71. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). See
generally LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 11-39.
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rejecting the statute. Even if it did not change any behavior but
instead drove all existing discrimination underground, the statute
would still perform the worthwhile function of sending one impor
tant message and retracting another. It sends the important social
message that discrimination is unlawful. It retracts the prior
message that lawyers can discriminate, even though virtually no one
else can. That message was harmful to the moral authority and im
age of the legal profession and undermined the societal commit
ment to eradicating discrimination; it is important to reject that
message.
Lawyer 3 extends to male prospective clients an offer of condi
tional representation. While she will represent them, she will in
quire carefully into the facts of a male homemaker's role and work
(and will not simply assume that an actual-as opposed to formal
equivalence with the role and work of a female homemaker). Fur
ther, she will not make the "plus factor" argument on behalf of a
male client. Lawyer 3 satisfies both affirmative defenses and will be
granted a conditional right to discriminate, not in representation
but in argumentation. As a matter of professional standards, a law
yer must have a reasonable amount of professional freedom to in
terpret the law and form opinions about which arguments to use in
particular cases. Given the Supreme Court decision in Kahn v.
Shevin,72 recognizing the legality of treating men and women differ
ently in some contexts on the basis of social conditions,73 Lawyer
3's interpretation is a reasonable and defensible one, although by
no means necessary or inevitable. It would be perfectly legitimate
for a lawyer down the street to reject this interpretation and to ar
gue that a "plus-factor" for females is illegal and that male and fe
male homemakers should (as a matter of policy) and must (as a
matter of law) be treated alike. The law is presently somewhat
open-ended in this area and a lawyer should have the freedom to
interpret the law either way and to reject an interpretation with
which she disagrees.
However, this freedom is not limitless, and the standards of
reasonable legal interpretation set the limits. The reasonableness
of Lawyer 3's interpretation of the "plus factor" argument is contin
72. 416 u.S. 351 (1974).
73. Kahn upheld a statute permitting a property tax exemption for widows but
not widowers. See id. at 351; see also Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per
curiam) (upholding Social Security benefit formula that treated women more favorably
than men); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (5-4 decision) (upholding differ
ent treatment of men and women in military discharge policy).
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gent on the state of "the law" at the time of the interpretation. If
the Supreme Court should reverse Kahn or similar cases using suit
ably broad language,74 Lawyer 3's argument might very well be
come an unreasonable legal interpretation, more like Lawyer 4's
view on inter-racial marriage. The boundaries of permissible law
yer discrimination are established by the professional standards
governing the lawyer's role.
Lawyer 4 presents an interesting variation. Because he objects
to inter-racial marriages, as a matter of personal principle (notwith
standing the fact that such marriages are legal and constitutionally
protected75 ), he will not represent a client, whether black or white,
who seeks legal representation concerning a prenuptial agreement
for an inter-racial marriage, although he will represent a white or
black person concerning a prenuptial agreement for a same-race
marriage. Under conventional discrimination analysis, his refusal
to represent a black or white client in these circumstances consti
tutes racial discrimination. 76
Unlike Lawyer 3, Lawyer 4 cannot justify his conduct as an
exercise of his professional responsibility to interpret the law and
decide which legal arguments to make. His position that prenuptial
agreements attached to inter-racial marriages are invalid is com
pletely wrong as a matter of law. If presented in court, it would be
rejected and would be grounds for a Rule 11 sanction. Therefore,
while Lawyer 4 is certainly free as a citizen to criticize inter-racial
marriages, he can hardly claim that such arguments are necessary to
or even permissible in the practice of law. Once again, we see that
there is limit to professionally-supported lawyer freedom to inter
pret the law, that the standards of reasonable legal interpretation
establish that limit, and that Lawyer 4 has exceeded it.
74. Such a reversal is not an idle possibility. The Kahn decision itself was 5-4.
Three years later, Justice Stevens indicated that he might vote to overrule Kahn, which
was decided before he joined the court. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 224
(1977) (Stevens, J., concurring). In Goldfarb, the Court, on a 5-4 vote, invalidated a
Social Security provision that treated widows and widowers differently in terms of set
ting eligibility for survivor benefits.
75. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 u.S. 1 (1967).
76. Lawyer 4 may argue that· his refusal to represent a client in such circum
stances is not racial discrimination, because it is based not on the race of the potential
client but on the race of the person that his potential client plans to marry. However,
under the reasoning of the Supreme Court in an analogous situation (discrimination
based not on the sex of the employee but on the sex of the employee's spouse), the
Supreme Court ruled that such one-step-removed discrimination was still unlawful dis
crimination. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669,
684 (1983).
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On the other hand, the hypothetical asks us to assume that
Lawyer 4 feels deeply about this issue and objects to any personal
involvement in such marriages on moral grounds. Let us further
assume that his objection is as strongly felt as that of the doctor
who objects to performing an abortion on moral or religious
grounds. For this doctor, not as an interpretation of professional
standards but through specific statutes, Congress and state legisla
tures have authorized the refusal to follow professional standards in
certain circumstances. 77 As a matter of professional standards
alone, the doctor would be required to provide an abortion, if medi
cally indicated after consultation with the patient. However,
notwithstanding these professional standards and the patient's
(Roe-based but McRae-limited) constitutional right,78 society has
provided a special exemption for the doctor who objects on moral
or religious grounds to a procedure that is required as a matter of
professional standards .. If the doctor is allowed to act on the basis
of his strongly felt objections, will Lawyer 4 and, for that matter,
Ollie, who also objects strongly on moral grounds to having Mri
can-Americans in his restaurant, be offered similar protection? The
answer is: maybe, if the legislature offers it. The doctor's protection
was a matter of legislative grace,· not professiomil standards, and
Lawyer 4 and Ollie will get relief only if the legislature provides it.
The legislature has already refused to grant Ollie relief, and for
good reason. The legislature assigned Ollie's objection a very low
value and further concluded that protecting Ollie's interest would
seriously hinder the enforcement of discrimination law. It would
authorize a "racist's veto" that would empower and validate resist
ance. I would expect that Lawyer 4's request would also be
rejected.
Lawyer 5 is Judith Nathanson. As I have indicated earlier, it is
unlikely that she can establish an affirmative defense for client re
jection. An examination of her stated reasons reveals their inade
77. See, e.g., 42 U.S.c. § 3000a-7(a) (1994) (no individual is required to perform
or participate in abortion if contrary to her religious beliefs or moral convictions);
MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 121 (1997) (statutory authorization to refuse to perform
abortions if an objection on religious or moral grounds is stated in writing; also authori
zation to nurses, social workers and psychologists to refuse to give counseling with re
spect to abortions).
78. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
While Roe and its progeny establish a right to be free of unreasonable government
regulation in obtaining an abortion, McRae established that the right was a negative
right to be free from unreasonable government regulation and not a positive right to be
entitled to government support.
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quacy. A desire "to devote her expertise to eliminating gender bias
in the court system" identifies an acceptable and commendable end
but does not justify the discriminatory means employed to achieve
it. The desire "to feel a commitment to her client's cause ... that in
family law she has only experienced ... in representing women" is
the "strong personal feelings" rationale that was examined and
found wanting in Section III-A. A statement that her practice fo
cuses on "the issues that arise in representing wives in divorce pro
ceedings" describes an acceptable area of specialization but does
not begin to address-let alone explain-why such specialization
requires the rejection of men whose cases involve the same issues.
Professor Miller suggests another reason-to enhance "'her credi
bility with judges"'79-that seems to me to trade unacceptably on
both gender stereotyping and vouching.
On the other hand, Judith Nathanson may be like Lawyer 3.
Although not fully developed in the record, one reading of the Na
thanson-Stropnicky interaction is that Mr. Stropnicky wanted to re
tain Judith Nathanson because he had strategically determined that
she, as a female attorney making the argument that worked so ef
fectively for female homemakers, could most persuasively make the
male homemaker argument on his behalf and that she rejected him
precisely because she refused to make the same argument for him
as she would for a female homemaker. In this view, he wanted to
enlist her and her representation to do exactly what she legitimately
did not want to do. If that is the case, then she is like Lawyer 3 and
can and should explain the restrictions on her advocacy to Mr.
Stropnicky and allow him to decide if he wants the conditional rep
resentation that she is willing (or, should I say, required) to offer
him.
Lawyer 6 is a combination of Lawyer 3 and Judith Nathanson.
Like Judith Nathanson, he cannot justify the outright rejection of
female clients. Specialization does not justify such discrimination,
and his male clients have no right to a "pure" lawyer, one who rep
resents only men. Unlike Lawyer 3 (and like Lawyer 4), his per
sonal and political beliefs go beyond the bounds of reasonable
interpretation. However, if Lawyer 6 limited his family law practice
to representing only the wealthier party, or the highest income

79. Bruce K. Miller, Lawyers' Identities, Client Selection and the Antidiscrimina
tion Principle: Thoughts on the Sanctioning of Judith Nathanson, 20 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 93, 95 (1998) (citation omitted).
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wage-earner, he presumably could accomplish many of his goals
without impermissibly discriminating because of sex.
V.

A POSSIBLE ApPROACH TO THE STROPNICKY ApPEAL

Judith Nathanson has appealed the Single Commissioner's de
cision in the Stropnicky case to the Full Commission of the Massa
chusetts Commission Against Discrimination, where the matter is
currently under review. 80 The Full Commission might consider the
approach suggested in this essay when it interprets the Massachu
setts Public Accommodation Statute. While the text of the law
does not contain any affirmative defenses,81 as a matter of statutory
construction and based on its expertise and experience, the Com
mission could well determine that the purposes of the statute would
be best served by recognizing the two suggested affirmative de
fenses. If the Commission recognized that affirmative defenses
were part of the proper interpretation of the statute, it would then
be wise to remand the case for further proceedings, to determine
whether Judith Nathanson qualifies for either of the affirmative de
fenses. It is likely that, upon remand, the Single Commissioner
would want to hear further testimony and argument on the many
factual and policy issues in the context of the particular case. It is
also possible that the Single Commissioner would want to use the
flexible powers granted the administrative agency and invite partici
pation (in some form-as amicus curiae or as intervenors) from the
Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers and from bar groups (in
cluding the Massachusetts Bar Association, the Women's Bar Asso
ciation and others) and civil rights and civic and professional
organizations.
A hearing on remand might provide a more comprehensive
and public engagement of the issues than was possible at the initial
hearing. By considering these issues within a familiar framework
that is clearly established in advance of the hearing, the Single
Commissioner and the Full Commission are likely to receive
stronger, more focused presentations from the parties and possible
intervenors and amici. This suggestion-a recognition of affirma
tive defenses and a remand for further proceedings-does not guar
antee any particular result. It does, however, provide some
80.

Review to the Full Commission is provided by MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B,

§ 3(6) (1997). Information about the pending appeal was obtained through a telephone

interview with Jerrold Levinsky, Esq., Acting General Counsel, MCAD (Feb. 23, 1998).
81. The statute was originally enacted in 1865. See supra note 20.
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assurance that the issues will be joined and adjudicated in a context
conducive to a reflective and fully-considered resolution.
CONCLUSION

The issue of lawyer discrimination brings new perspectives to
traditional topics like the practice of law, the role of the lawyer and
the relationship with, and rights of, the client. It forces us to ex
amine the nature of lawyer discretion, the limits of that discretion
and the consequences of trying to regulate that discretion. The ex
amination is a daunting task.
This essay offers an approach that attempts to protect both the
prohibition against discrimination and the practice of law and to
accommodate the tension that necessarily accompanies this effort.
It suggests that the best solution is to prohibit lawyers from discrim
inating in client selection but to permit attorneys to use reasonable
professional judgment in selecting the issues and arguments that
they are willing to raise on behalf of a client. It discusses the con
cept of "conditional representation" inherent in the proposal and
concludes that the problems associated with this concept are far
preferable to the problems associated with any other alternative.
With the new California rule, the requirements of the Ameri
cans with Disability Act and the recent MCAD decision, this issue
will be increasingly before courts, legislators, bar associations, civil
rights agencies and, ultimately, the public. I offer my proposal as a
contribution to the ongoing debate.

